Best Strategy for Each Team in The Regular Season to Win Champion in The
  Knockout Tournament by Zhou, Zijie
Best Strategy for Each Team in The Regular Season to Win Champion
in The Knockout Tournament
Zijie Zhou
Department of Mathematics, Purdue University,
zhou759@purdue.edu
Mentor: Jonathon Peterson
Professor of Department of Mathematics, Purdue University,
peterson@purdue.edu
June 5, 2020
Abstract
In ‘J. Schwenk.(2018) [3] What is the Correct Way to Seed a Knockout Tournament? Retrieved
from The American Mathematical Monthly’ , Schwenk identified a surprising weakness in the stan-
dard method of seeding a single elimination (or knockout) tournament. In particular, he showed that
for a certain probability model for the outcomes of games it can be the case that the top seeded
team would be less likely to win the tournament than the second seeded team. This raises the pos-
sibility that in certain situations it might be advantageous for a team to intentionally lose a game
in an attempt to get a more optimal (though possibly lower) seed in the tournament. We examine
this question in the context of a four team league which consists of a round robin “regular season”
followed by a single elimination tournament with seedings determined by the results from the regular
season [4]. Using the same probability model as Schwenk we show that there are situations where
it is indeed optimal for a team to intentionally lose. Moreover, we show how a team can make the
decision as to whether or not it should intentionally lose. We did two detailed analysis. One is for
the situation where other teams always try to win every game. The other is for the situation where
other teams are smart enough, namely they can also lose some games intentionally if necessary. The
analysis involves computations in both probability and (multi-player) game theory.
1 Introduction
In contemporary society, sport competitions such as NBA, NCAA basketball, baseball are more and
more prevalent and attracting. In most of these competitions, every team in the knockout tournament
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has to play head-to-head matches to eliminate the rival and finally tries best to win the tournament.
Whether the knockout tournament is fair and what strategy each team has under the knockout tourna-
ment is sparking argue between fans every day. In this article, we use the single elimination tournament
model created by J. Schwenk.(2018) [3]. We assume that there are four teams in the playoff: a1, a2,
a3, and a4. Each of them has a weight, v1, v2, v3, v4, respectively, which shows the strength of a team.
The larger weight, the stronger the team is. Suppose that v1 ≥ v2 ≥ v3 ≥ v4, here a1 is the best team
in the knockout tournament and we will give the best strategy for it. Let the probability team vi beats
vj be
vi
vi+vj
. The schedule of the knockout tournament is in figure 1. In the first round, the first seed
plays against the fourth seed. The second seed plays against the third seed. In the second round, the
winner between the first seed and the fourth seed plays against the winner between the second seed and
the third seed. According to the model created by J. Schwenk [3], he showed that under some specific
situation it is possible for a lower seeded team to enter the tournament with a larger probability to
win the tournament than the highest seeded team. This implies that a team might intentionally lose
a game during the regular season to become a lower seed to enter the tournament. If all other teams
try to become higher-seeded team, it is not hard for us to make a strategy which we can enter the
tournament with the proper seed which has the highest probability to win the champion. However, it is
more interesting that if all other teams also lose some games intentionally to maximize the probability
to win the tournament. In this situation, we are faced with a game theory problem. We will show how
to find the best strategy in this situation and whether every team can maximize the probability to win
the tournament respectively.
Figure 1: The schedule of the tournament model
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1.1 Main Contributions
We build a regular season model with four teams and conduct a detailed analysis of the best team’s
strategy, which can help the best team to decide whether to win or lose intentionally in every week
in the regular season. It is noteworthy that this model is based on assumption that other teams try
their best to win every match, or we can say other teams are not smart enough. We called this Four
Teams Regular Season with Not Smart Enough Rivals Model (FRNS). However, in the real world, every
professional team is smart enough. Every team has intelligent people to make decisions for them. Thus,
we build another model, which assumes that all teams are smart enough and are able to make the most
correct decision for them. We call this Four Teams Regular Season with Smart Enough Rivals Model
(FRS). More importantly, FRS can get strategy for every team in the regular season.
In game theory, we define pure strategy as a strategy which determines the move a player will make
for any situation they could face. We define mixed strategy as an assignment of probability to each
pure strategy. In the FRNS model, undoubtedly, the strategy we give to the best team in each week
depends on other teams’ weights and the current performance of each team. We define the pii as the
action variable for team ai. That is pii = α represents team ai tries to win with probability α and
loses intentionally with probability 1 − α, where α ∈ [0, 1]. We define Π as the collection of vectors
pi = (pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4), i.e. Π = [0, 1]
4. We also define P
(i)
pi (m,W, V ) as the probability for team ai to win the
champion under action vector pi ∈ Π, team weight vector V and performance vector W in week m. The
team weight vector V = [v1, v2, v3, v4] which contains team weights for all team. The performance vector
W = [W1,W2,W3,W4], where Wi represents the number of winning games before week m for team ai.
Thus, our objective is to find suppi=(α,1,1,1) P
(1)
pi (m,W, V ) for every m, W and V . We claim that: under
the FRNS model, for all m, W and possible V , argmaxpi=(α,1,1,1) P
(1)
pi (m,W, V ) ∈ {(0, 1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 1, 1)},
which shows that the best strategy for the best team in every week is pure strategy. Intuitively, the
reason is that other teams’ strategies are fixed, i.e. pi2, pi3, pi4 = 1.
However, in the FRS model, the action of every team is not fixed due to all teams are smart enough.
Our objective is to find suppi∈Π P
(i)
pi (m,W, V ) for every m, W , V and i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. To our surprise,
the final result shows that the best strategy of every team is not mixed strategy, but pure strategy for
almost all possible team weight. Every team can have mixed strategy only in a special case where team
a1 is as strong as a2, at the same time team a3 is as strong as a4.
Theorem 1.1. Under the FRS model, for all m, W , pi = (pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4) satisfies that for each i ∈
{1, 2, 3, 4}, P (i)pi (m,W, V ) ≥ P (i)pi′ (m,W, V ) for ∀pi
′
s.t. pi
′
j = pij, j 6= i is a mixed strategy, i.e. pi ∈ (0, 1)4
if and only if v1 = v2, v3 = v4. Otherwise, pi is a pure strategy, i.e. pi ∈ {0, 1}4.
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2 Analysis for the FRNS Model
2.1 Description and Assumption of FRNS Model
In this section, we want to analyze the ‘regular season’ to get a strategy for the best team to decide
whether to try to win or lose intentionally in each game. Our logic is that first to analyze the last game
in the ‘regular season’, second to analyze the last two games, third to analyze the last three games, and
so on. Before doing the analysis, we will first introduce our FRNS model.
The FRNS model is that we have four teams, a1, a2, a3, a4. Their weight is V = [v1, v2, v3, v4].
Assume that v1 ≥ v2 ≥ v3 ≥ v4, so we will help team a1 to get a strategy pi1 ∈ [0, 1]. The winning
probability in a single game between ai and aj is pij =
vi
vi+vj
[3]. We suppose that except a1, other teams
will try their best to win for every match, i.e. pi2 = pi3 = pi4 = 1. Define the subset (α, 1, 1, 1) = Πˆ ⊆ Π,
where α ∈ [0, 1], then pi1 is such that (pi1, 1, 1, 1) = argmaxpi∈Πˆ P
(1)
pi (m,W, V ) such that for any week m,
performance vector W , and possible V . In addition, we build a particular schedule for last three weeks
(see figure 2).
Figure 2: A particular schedule for last three weeks
Since there are four teams, there are 4! = 24 seedings in the knockout tournament. However, there
exists three types of knockout tournaments, we ignore the exact rank of each team and we only care that
which two teams will have a battle in the first week (see figure 3). Here we need another assumption:
Assumptions. If the number of winning games of two teams is the same, then they will flip a fair coin
to decide their seeding in the knockout tournament.
For example, if finally a1 and a2 win 2 games, a3 and a4 win 1 game, then in this situation, a1
and a2 will have same probability, 50%, to be the first and the second seed. a3 and a4 will have same
probability, 50%, to be the third and the fourth seed. If finally a1 wins 3 games and all of a2, a3 and
a4 win 1 game, then, a1 is the first seed and a2, a3 and a4 will have same probability, 33.33%, to be the
second, third, and the fourth seed.
An interesting idea is that we find the probability for a1 to win the champion in tournament A is
4
Figure 3: three kind of knockout tournaments
always larger than the one in tournament B and tournament C, no matter what vector V is. Suppose
that the probability for a1 to win the champion in tournament A, B, C is TA, TB, TC , respectively.
Theorem 2.1. For any weight vector V , subject to v1 ≥ v2 ≥ v3 ≥ v4, we have
TA ≥ TB ≥ TC (1)
The proof of theorem 2.1 can be found in appendix A.1.
We have introduced that our logic is to first analyze the strategy in last week. In the last week,
there exists fifteen different W vectors: [2, 2, 0, 0], [2, 1, 0, 1], [2, 1, 1, 0], [2, 0, 1, 1], [1, 1, 1, 1], [1, 2, 0, 1],
[1, 2, 1, 0], [1, 1, 2, 0], [1, 0, 2, 1], [1, 1, 0, 2], [1, 0, 1, 2], [0, 1, 1, 2], [0, 0, 2, 2], [0, 1, 2, 1], [0, 2, 1, 1]. In the next
part, we will pick one specific W vector to do analysis as an example.
2.2 Example W = [2, 2, 0, 0]
If at the beginning of last week, the performance vector W is [2, 2, 0, 0], we first consider the game
a3 vs a4. There are two possible results: a3 wins or a4 wins. If a3 wins, W will become [2, 2, 1, 0].
If a4 wins, W will become [2, 2, 0, 1]. Then we will analyze the match a1 vs a2. If a1 tries to win,
two situations may happen: a1 wins and a1 loses. However, if a1 wants to lose intentionally, the only
possible result is a1 loses. Assume that a3 defeats a4 and W = [2, 2, 1, 0], if a1 defeats a2, W will
become [3, 2, 1, 0], which leads to tournament A. If a2 defeats a1, W will become [2, 3, 1, 0], which leads
to tournament B.
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a1 a3
Win Vector
(W)
Tournament
Probability for team a1 to win
champion
Win Win [3, 2, 1, 0] A p12p34TA
Win Lose [3, 2, 0, 1] B p12p43TB
Lose Win [2, 3, 1, 0] B p21p34TB
Lose Lose [2, 3, 0, 1] A p21p43TA
Table 1: analysis table if a1 tries to win
a1 a3
Win Vector
(W)
Tournament
Probability for team a1 to win
champion
Lose Win [2, 3, 1, 0] B p34TB
Lose Lose [2, 3, 0, 1] A p43TA
Table 2: analysis table if a1 loses intentionally
Now we can calculate the probability for a1 to win the tournament based on different strategy pi1 in
last match. Recall that a3 defeats a4 with probability p34, and if it happens, W will become [2, 2, 1, 0].
a4 defeats a3 with probability p43, and if it happens, W will become [2, 2, 0, 1].
W =
{
[2,2,1,0], with probability p34
[2,2,0,1], with probability p43
(2)
If a1 tries to win the last match, the analysis is in table 1. Thus, the total probability for a1 to win
the champion if a1 tries to win in the last match is P
(1)
pi=(1,1,1,1)(3, [2, 2, 0, 0], V ) = p12p34TA + p12p43TB +
p21p34TB +p21p43TA. If a1 loses intentionally, then the analysis is in table 2. Thus, the total probability
for a1 to win the champion if a1 loses intentionally in the last match is P
(1)
pi=(0,1,1,1)(3, [2, 2, 0, 0], V ) =
p34TB+p43TA. Under particular weight vector V = [v1, v2, v3, v4], we compare P
(1)
pi=(1,1,1,1)(3, [2, 2, 0, 0], V )
and P
(1)
pi=(0,1,1,1)(3, [2, 2, 0, 0], V ), the larger one represents the strategy for a1.
Theorem 2.2. Under W = [2, 2, 0, 0] at the beginning of the last week, a1 should always try to win no
matter what weight vector V is.
The proof of theorem 2.2 can be found in appendix A.2. Next, we will show the analytical results
for all W .
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2.3 Analytical Results
We assume that v1 = 1, v2, v3, v4 are in (0, 1), and v2 ≥ v3 ≥ v4. We let v2 be the x axis, v3 be
the y axis, v4 be the z axis. The region in the plots is the set {V = (1, v2, v3, v4)|P (1)pi=(0,1,1,1)(3,W, V )−
P
(1)
pi=(1,1,1,1)(3,W, V ) ≥ 0, v2 ≥ v3 ≥ v4} for given W . Here are the results.
For W = [2, 2, 0, 0], [2, 1, 1, 0], [1, 1, 2, 0], [1, 1, 1, 1], [1, 0, 2, 1], [0, 2, 1, 1], [0, 1, 2, 1], [0, 0, 2, 2], since
we have completed the analysis of the situation where W = [2, 2, 0, 0] by theorem 2.2, the analysis of
rest seven situations of W is similar to the W = [2, 2, 0, 0] example. After some calculation, we can
know that for every V , P
(1)
pi=(0,1,1,1)(3,W, V )−P
(1)
pi=(1,1,1,1)(3,W, V ) ≤ 0. Thus, it is always sensible for a1
to try to win the last match if these eight situations happen.
ForW = [2, 1, 0, 1], [2, 0, 1, 1], [1, 1, 0, 2], [1, 0, 1, 2], by the similar method, we find that P
(1)
pi=(0,1,1,1)(3,W, V )−
P
(1)
pi=(1,1,1,1)(3,W, V ) ≥ 0 holds for every V . We can conclude that the region in figure 4 is the whole
region, i.e. {V = (1, v2, v3, v4)|v2 ≥ v3 ≥ v4}. Thus, it is always sensible for a1 to lose the last match
intentionally if these four situations happen.
Figure 4: the 3d region plot for the difference of two values in [2, 1, 0, 1], [2, 0, 1, 1], [1, 1, 0, 2], [1, 0, 1, 2]
For [1, 2, 0, 1] and [0, 1, 1, 2], similarly, we can find that the strategy for a1 to decide whether to try
to win or lose intentionally in the last match depends on the team weight vector V = (1, v2, v3, v4).
Different team weight leads to different strategy.
Theorem 2.3. Under a specific team weight vector V = (1, v2, v3, v4), W = [1, 2, 0, 1] or [0, 1, 1, 2], then
a1 should try to win if and only if the following inequality holds. Otherwise, a1 should lose intentionally.
3v2v3v
2
4 + 2v2v
3
4 + 6v
2
2v
2
3v4 + v2v
2
3v4 + v
3
3v4 + 2v3v
3
4 + 10v
2
3v
2
4 − 3v22v33
− v22v3v24 − 2v22v34 − v2v43 − 3v2v33v4 − 2v2v23v24 − v43v4 − 6v33v24 − 6v23v34 ≤ 0
The proof of theorem 2.3 can be found in appendix A.3. The plot of this region is figure 5, which is
made by Mathematica.
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Figure 5: the 3d region plot for the difference of two values in [1, 2, 0, 1] and [0, 1, 1, 2]
For [1, 2, 1, 0], we can find that the strategy for a1 to decide whether to try to win or lose intentionally
in the last match depends on the team weight vector V = (1, v2, v3, v4). Different team weight leads to
different strategy. Next theorem will show the relationship between the strategy and vector V :
Theorem 2.4. Under a specific team weight vector V = (1, v2, v3, v4), W = [1, 2, 1, 0], then a1 should
try to win if and only if the following inequality holds. Otherwise, a1 should lose intentionally.
3v22v
2
3v4 + v2v
4
3 + v2v
3
3v4 + v
3
3v
2
4 + 4v
3
3v4 + 4v
2
3v
2
4 + 5v2v3v4
− 4v22v3v24 − 5v22v34 − 4v43v4 − 2v2v3v24 − v23v4 − v3v24 ≤ 0
The proof of theorem 2.4 can be found in appendix A.4. The plot of this region is in figure 6, which
is made by Mathematica.
Figure 6: the 3d region plot for the difference of two values in [1, 2, 1, 0]
2.4 Analysis for the Second Week
After completing the analysis of the last week, we want to analyze for the second week. Our idea is
that given a winning vector W ∗ at the beginning of the second week and the team weight vector V , if
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team a1 tries to win, then four situations may happen on the second week: a1 defeats a3, a2 defeats a4
with probability p13p24; a1 defeats a3, a4 defeats a2 with probability p13p42; a3 defeats a1, a2 defeats
a4 with probability p31p24; a3 defeats a1, a4 defeats a2 with probability p31p42. Assume these four
situations bring W ∗ to W1, W2, W3, W4 respectively, since we have completed the analysis of the last
week, then we can get
P
(1)
pi=(1,1,1,1)(2,W
∗, V ) = p13p24 max{P (1)pi=(1,1,1,1)(3,W1, V ), P
(1)
pi=(0,1,1,1)(3,W1, V )}
+ p13p42 max{P (1)pi=(1,1,1,1)(3,W2, V ), P
(1)
pi=(0,1,1,1)(3,W2, V )}
+ p31p24 max{P (1)pi=(1,1,1,1)(3,W3, V ), P
(1)
pi=(0,1,1,1)(3,W3, V )}
+ p31p42 max{P (1)pi=(1,1,1,1)(3,W4, V ), P
(1)
pi=(0,1,1,1)(3,W4, V )}
If a1 loses intentionally in the second week, then two situations may happen on the second week: a3
defeats a1, a2 defeats a4 with probability p24; a3 defeats a1, a4 defeats a2 with probability p42. These
two situations bring W ∗ to W3, W4 respectively, then we can get
P
(1)
pi=(0,1,1,1)(2,W
∗, V ) = p24 max{P (1)pi=(1,1,1,1)(3,W3, V ), P
(1)
pi=(0,1,1,1)(3,W3, V )}
+ p42 max{P (1)pi=(1,1,1,1)(3,W4, V ), P
(1)
pi=(0,1,1,1)(3,W4, V )}
Theorem 2.5. Suppose the winning vector is W ∗ at the beginning of the second week, then if
P
(1)
pi=(1,1,1,1)(2,W
∗, V ) ≥ P (1)pi=(0,1,1,1)(2,W ∗, V ) (3)
a1 should try to win in the second week. Otherwise, a1 should lose intentionally.
Next, we take W ∗ = [1, 1, 0, 0] as an example.
2.4.1 Example: W ∗ = [1, 1, 0, 0]
Suppose that after the first week, W ∗ = [1, 1, 0, 0], then if a1 tries to win in the second week, after
the second week, W∗ may become the following four vectors:
[2,2,0,0], with probability p13p24
[2,1,0,1], with probability p13p42
[1,2,1,0], with probability p31p24
[1,1,1,1], with probability p31p42
(4)
Since we have already found the best strategy under W1 = [2, 2, 0, 0], W2 = [2, 1, 0, 1], W3 =
[1, 2, 1, 0], W4 = [1, 1, 1, 1], recall that P
1
pi=(1,1,1,1)(2,W
∗, V ) is the probability for a1 to win the champion
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under W ∗ = [1, 1, 0, 0] at the beginning of the second week if a1 tries to win in the second week, then
by theorem 2.5 , we can get
P
(1)
pi=(1,1,1,1)(2, [1, 1, 0, 0], V ) = p13p24 max{P
(1)
pi=(1,1,1,1)(3, [2, 2, 0, 0], V ), P
(1)
pi=(0,1,1,1)(3, [2, 2, 0, 0], V )}
+ p13p42 max{P (1)pi=(1,1,1,1)(3, [2, 1, 0, 1], V ), P
(1)
pi=(0,1,1,1)(3, [2, 1, 0, 1], V )}
+ p31p24 max{P (1)pi=(1,1,1,1)(3, [1, 2, 1, 0], V ), P
(1)
pi=(0,1,1,1)(3, [1, 2, 1, 0], V )}
+ p31p42 max{P (1)pi=(1,1,1,1)(3, [1, 1, 1, 1], V ), P
(1)
pi=(0,1,1,1)(3, [1, 1, 1, 1], V )}
Similarly, recall that P 1pi=(0,1,1,1)(2,W
∗, V ) is the probability for a1 to win the champion under
W ∗ = [1, 1, 0, 0] at the beginning of the second week if a1 loses intentionally in the second week, note
the W ∗ may become the following two vectors:{
[1,2,1,0], with probability p24
[1,1,1,1], with probability p42
(5)
Then, P
(1)
pi=(0,1,1,1)(2,W
∗, V ) can be calculated by theorem 2.5.
P
(1)
pi=(0,1,1,1)(2, [1, 1, 0, 0], V ) = p24 max{P
(1)
pi=(1,1,1,1)(3, [1, 2, 1, 0], V ), P
(1)
pi=(0,1,1,1)(3, [1, 2, 1, 0], V )}
+ p42 max{P (1)pi=(1,1,1,1)(3, [1, 1, 1, 1], V ), P
(1)
pi=(0,1,1,1)(3, [1, 1, 1, 1], V )}
Now, it is natural to compare the difference between P
(1)
pi=(1,1,1,1)(2, [1, 1, 0, 0], V ) and P
(1)
pi=(0,1,1,1)(2, [1, 1, 0, 0], V )
to get the best strategy in the second week. We will show the result in the following subsection.
2.4.2 Analytical Results
We assume that v1 = 1, v2, v3, v4 are in (0, 1), and v2 ≥ v3 ≥ v4. We let v2 be the x axis, v3 be
the y axis, v4 be the z axis. It is worth mentioning that in this section, we only provide the plots by
Mathematica for the set {V = (v2, v3, v4)|Ppi=(0,1,1,1)(2,W, V ) − Ppi=(1,1,1,1)(2,W, V ) ≥ 0} for given W
instead of giving an analytical formula for the region, because the analytical formula is consisted of
several extremely complicated polynomial, which is hard to write it out explicitly.
For W = [1, 1, 0, 0], the result is in figure 7. The region in the plot is the set
{V = (v2, v3, v4)|Ppi=(0,1,1,1)(2,W, V )− Ppi=(1,1,1,1)(2,W, V ) ≥ 0} where W = [1, 1, 0, 0].
We can also get the region plot by Mathematica under W = [1, 0, 1, 0], [0, 1, 0, 1], [0, 0, 1, 1], the
results are in figure 8.
Thus, a1 can decide to try to win or lose intentionally in the second week from the figure 7, 8. Now
we move to analyze the strategy for a1 in the first week!
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Figure 7: values of v2, v3, v4 such that Ppi=(0,1,1,1)(2,W, V ) − Ppi=(1,1,1,1)(2,W, V ) ≥ 0 under W =
[1, 1, 0, 0]
Figure 8: Left:values of v2, v3, v4 such that Ppi=(0,1,1,1)(2,W, V ) − Ppi=(1,1,1,1)(2,W, V ) ≥ 0 under W =
[1, 0, 1, 0]. Middle:values of v2, v3, v4 such that Ppi=(0,1,1,1)(2,W, V ) − Ppi=(1,1,1,1)(2,W, V ) ≥ 0 under
W = [0, 1, 0, 1]. Right:values of v2, v3, v4 such that Ppi=(0,1,1,1)(2,W, V )−Ppi=(1,1,1,1)(2,W, V ) ≥ 0 under
W = [0, 0, 1, 1]
2.5 Analysis for the First Week
After completing the analysis of the second week, we want to analyze for the first week. In the first
week, if a1 tries to win, winning vector W may go to these four situations:
[1,1,0,0], with probability p14p23
[1,0,1,0], with probability p14p32
[0,1,0,1], with probability p41p23
[0,0,1,1], with probability p41p32
(6)
Since we have already found the best strategy under [1, 1, 0, 0], [1, 0, 1, 0], [0, 1, 0, 1], [0, 0, 1, 1], recall
that P 1pi=(1,1,1,1)(1, [0, 0, 0, 0], V ) is the probability for a1 to win the champion at the beginning of the
first week if a1 tries to win, similar to the analysis for the second week, we can get:
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P 1pi=(1,1,1,1)(1, [0, 0, 0, 0], V ) = p14p23 max{P (1)pi=(1,1,1,1)(2, [1, 1, 0, 0], V ), P
(1)
pi=(0,1,1,1)(2, [1, 1, 0, 0], V )}
+ p14p32 max{P (1)pi=(1,1,1,1)(2, [1, 0, 1, 0], V ), P
(1)
pi=(0,1,1,1)(2, [1, 0, 1, 1], V )}
+ p41p23 max{P (1)pi=(1,1,1,1)(2, [0, 1, 0, 1], V ), P
(1)
pi=(0,1,1,1)(2, [0, 1, 0, 1], V )}
+ p41p32 max{P (1)pi=(1,1,1,1)(2, [0, 0, 1, 1], V ), P
(1)
pi=(0,1,1,1)(2, [0, 0, 1, 1], V )}
If a1 loses intentionally, winning vector W may go to these two situations:{
[0,1,0,1], with probability p23
[0,0,1,1], with probability p32
(7)
Then, P
(1)
pi=(0,1,1,1)(1, [0, 0, 0, 0], V ) can be written as
P
(1)
pi=(0,1,1,1)(1, [0, 0, 0, 0], V ) = p23 max{P
(1)
pi=(1,1,1,1)(2, [0, 1, 0, 1], V ), P
(1)
pi=(0,1,1,1)(2, [0, 1, 0, 1], V )}
+ p32 max{P (1)pi=(1,1,1,1)(2, [0, 0, 1, 1], V ), P
(1)
pi=(0,1,1,1)(2, [0, 0, 1, 1], V )}
Next we can compare the difference and due to the huge amount of calculation, the Mathematica
cannot provide a nice 3d region plot, instead, we use Python to make the 3d scatter plot, which can also
provide some information of the rough shape of the region. We let v2 be the x axis, v3 be the y axis, v4
be the z axis. The points in the plots is the set of point {V = (v2, v3, v4)|P 1pi=(0,1,1,1)(1, [0, 0, 0, 0], V )−
P 1pi=(1,1,1,1)(1, [0, 0, 0, 0], V ) ≥ 0} for given W . Here is the result.
Thus, a1 can investigate the team weight of a2, a3, a4 at the beginning of the first week. If their
team weight is in figure 9, a1 should lose intentionally in the first week. Otherwise, a1 should try to
win. Hence, we have fully analyzed this FRNS model and in the next part we will analyze the FRS
model.
3 Analysis for the FRS Model
3.1 Description and Assumption of FRS Model
In this part, all assumptions are as same as the model in previous section except for the strategies
of the other three teams. Recall that in the FRNS model, we assume that other teams try to win every
game, i.e. pi2 = pi3 = pi4 = 1. However, in this part, we assume that other three teams are smart enough
to lose some games intentionally to maximize their winning probability of the tournament. Hence, the
strategy for one particular game may not be pure strategy. Instead, every team may have a mixed
strategy for each game. In this model, pii ∈ [0, 1] for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. Note that the boundary point 0
represents the strategy to lose intentionally and 1 represents the strategy to try to win. If pii /∈ {0, 1},
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Figure 9: the list points of [v2, v3, v4] when it is better for a1 to lose intentionally in week 1
it means team ai tries to win with probability pii and loses intentionally with probability 1 − pii. We
assume that while two teams ai and aj are playing a game, if both of them try to win, then ai has
probability pij =
vi
vi+vj
to win. If one of them tries to win and the other loses intentionally, then we
assume that the one who tries to win will have 100% probability to win this game. If both of them loses
intentionally, then the game is decided by flipping a fair coin. In the game theory problem with mixed
strategy, we usually have to find the Nash equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium is a concept of game
theory where the optimal outcome of a game is one where no player has an incentive to deviate from his
chosen strategy after considering an opponent’s choice. Hence, in this model, in week m, given winning
vector W and weight vector V , pi = (pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4) is a Nash equilibrium if for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4},
P
(i)
pi (m,W, V ) ≥ P (i)pi′ (m,W, V ) for ∀pi
′
s.t. pi
′
j = pij ,j 6= i.
3.2 Example W = [1, 2, 0, 1]
3.2.1 Analysis for (pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4)
Similar with the analysis of FRNS model, we still first analyze the last game. Take W = [1, 2, 0, 1]
as an example, recall that in our FRNS model, we denote TA, TB, TC as the probability for a1 to win
the champion in tournament A, B, C respectively. In this section, we define Tij as the probability team
ai to win the champion in the tournament j, where i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, j ∈ {A,B,C}. By Theorem 2.1, we
know that T1A ≥ T1B ≥ T1C when v1 ≥ v2 ≥ v3 ≥ v4. Since in our FRS model, we not only analyze the
strategy of a1, but also analyze the strategies of a2, a3, a4. Next, we will introduce a lemma to show
the relationship between Tij .
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Lemma 3.1. If v1 ≥ v2 ≥ v3 ≥ v4, then
T1A ≥ T1B ≥ T1C (8)
T2B ≥ T2A ≥ T2C (9)
T3C ≥ T3A ≥ T3B (10)
T4C ≥ T4B ≥ T4A (11)
The proof of lemma 3.1 can be found in the appendix A.5. We just simply calculate all these
variables and find the difference between each of them.
In addition, we assume that in week 3, a1 vs a2, a3 vs a4 happen simultaneously. Thus, before
playing the game, any team cannot know the result of the other game. We introduce two variables:
A12, A34, which represent the real probability for a1 defeats a2, and a3 defeats a4. The real probability
of A12 is the sum of winning probability for a1 under four situations: a1 tries to win and a2 tries to win,
a1 tries to win and a2 loses intentionally, a1 loses intentionally and a2 tries to win, a1 loses intentionally
and a2 loses intentionally. Recall that in this section, we still assume that if both team lose intentionally,
we can flip a fair coin to decide who wins the game. Thus, the formula of A12 is:
A12 = v12pi1pi2 + pi1(1− pi2) + 1
2
(1− pi1)(1− pi2) (12)
Similarly,
A34 = v34pi3pi4 + pi3(1− pi4) + 1
2
(1− pi3)(1− pi4) (13)
Next, we define the payoff function as the probability to win the champion under given strategy.
Define Qij , i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, j ∈ {a, b, c, d} as the probability for ai to win the tournament under condition
j, such that Q1a, Q2a, represents the probability for a1, a2 to win the champion if both a1 and a2 tries
to win, respectively. Q1b, Q2b, represents the probability for a1, a2 to win the champion if a1 loses
intentionally and a2 tries to win, respectively. Q1c, Q2c, represents the probability for a1, a2 to win the
champion if a1 tries to win and a2 loses intentionally, respectively. Q1d, Q2d, represents the probability
for a1, a2 to win the champion if both a1 and a2 loses intentionally, respectively. Similarly, we define
Q3a, Q4a as the probability for a3, a4 to win the champion if both a3 and a4 tries to win, respectively.
Q3b, Q4b, represents the probability for a3, a4 to win the champion if a3 loses intentionally and a4 tries
to win, respectively. Q3c, Q4c, represents the probability for a3, a4 to win the champion if a3 tries to
win and a4 loses intentionally, respectively. Q3d, Q4d, represents the probability for a3, a4 to win the
champion if both a3 and a4 loses intentionally, respectively.
To calculate the payoff functions, we show some examples. For example, to calculate Q1a, we
notice that if a3 defeats a4, then W = [1, 2, 1, 1]. If both a1 and a2 tries to win and if a1 wins, then
W = [2, 2, 1, 1], recall our flipping coin assumption, a1 has
1
2(T1A+T1B) probability to win the champion.
If a2 wins, then W = [1, 3, 1, 1], a1 has
1
3(T1A+T1B +T1C) probability to win the champion. Otherwise,
if a4 defeats a3, then W = [1, 2, 0, 2], then if a1 wins, W = [2, 2, 0, 2], a1 has
1
3(T1A + T1B + T1C)
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Figure 10: The game theory table for four teams
probability to win the champion. If a2 wins, W = [1, 3, 0, 2], a1 will enter tournament A, and has T1A
probability to win the champion. Thus,
Q1a = A34(v12
1
2
(T1A+T1B)+(1−v12)1
3
(T1A+T1B+T1C))+(1−A34)(v12 1
3
((T1A+T1B+T1C)+(1−v12)T1A)
(14)
Notice that if i = 1, 2, Qij is a function with parameter v1, v2, v3, v4, A34. Since A34 is a function
with parameter pi3, pi4,
Qij = Fij(v1, v2, v3, v4, pi3, pi4) (15)
Similarly, if i = 3, 4,
Qij = Fij(v1, v2, v3, v4, pi1, pi2) (16)
Now, we want to introduce our method to calculate pi = (pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4). In our algorithm, the main
logic is to write the probability for each team to win the champion as a function with variable pi and Qij .
By the definition of the Nash equilibrium, if all teams own mixed strategy, then the partial derivatives
of probability for team ai to win the champion with respect to the variable pii all equal to 0. If not, the
teams will have pure strategy. Thus, we calculate the partial derivative of the probability for each team
to win the champion respect to the team i’s strategy pii and get the solutions of pi. We will expand the
analysis of how to solve pi now. Recall that in our main logic, firstly, we have to find the probability of
each team to win the champion. Let E1, E2, E3, E4 be probability of team a1, a2, a3, a4 to win the
tournament, respectively. Recall that Qij , i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, j ∈ {a, b, c, d} is the probability for ai to win
the champion under condition j. Define P (j) as the probability of event j. Here for team ai, we have
Ei =
∑
j∈{a,b,c,d}
QijP (j) (17)
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For example, recall that Q1a, Q1b, Q1c, Q1d represents the probability for a1 to win the tournament
if both a1 and a2 tries to win, if a1 loses intentionally and a2 tries to win, if a1 tries to win and a2
loses intentionally, and if both a1 and a2 loses intentionally, respectively. Then by equation 17, we have
E1 = pi1pi2Q1a + (1 − pi1)pi2Q1b + pi1(1 − pi2)Q1c + (1 − pi1)(1 − pi2)Q1d. Similarly, we can write the
following equation system.
E1 = pi1pi2Q1a + (1− pi1)pi2Q1b + pi1(1− pi2)Q1c + (1− pi1)(1− pi2)Q1d,
E2 = pi1pi2Q2a + (1− pi1)pi2Q2b + pi1(1− pi2)Q2c + (1− pi1)(1− pi2)Q2d,
E3 = pi3pi4Q3a + (1− pi3)pi4Q3b + pi3(1− pi4)Q3c + (1− pi3)(1− pi4)Q3d,
E4 = pi3pi4Q4a + (1− pi3)pi4Q4b + pi3(1− pi4)Q4c + (1− pi3)(1− pi4)Q4d,
(18)
Secondly, we want to see how each team’s strategy effects their winning probability. We calculate
the partial derivative for each probability in equation system 18 with respect to the variable pii, recall
that Q1j , Q2j only depend on pi3 and pi4, Q3j , Q4j only depend on pi1 and pi2, then, we can get
∂E1
∂pi1
= pi2(Q1a −Q1b −Q1c +Q1d) +Q1c −Q1d,
∂E2
∂pi2
= pi1(Q2a −Q2b −Q2c +Q2d) +Q2b −Q2d,
∂E3
∂pi3
= pi4(Q3a −Q3b −Q3c +Q3d) +Q3c −Q3d,
∂E4
∂pi4
= pi3(Q4a −Q4b −Q4c +Q4d) +Q4b −Q4d,
(19)
From equation system 19, we notice that ∂Ei∂pii is linearly related to the strategy variable pij , where
aj is the rival of ai in the last week. Hence, we can draw the following conclusion:
Theorem 3.1. If ∂Ei∂pii 6= 0, then team ai should make a pure strategy. Moreover, if
∂Ei
∂pii
> 0, team ai
should try to win. If ∂Ei∂pii < 0, team ai should lose intentionally.
Proof. Notice that if ∂Ei∂pii > 0, then
∂Ei
∂pii
is a linear function with positive slope. We get the maximum
of Ei if pii achieves its maximum, which is 1. Similarly, if
∂Ei
∂pii
< 0, then we get the maximum of Ei if
pii achieves its minimum, which is 0.
Now, we focus on finding the Nash equilibrium. We first apply the Nash’s Existence Theorem to
show the existence of the Nash equilibrium pi.
Theorem 3.2 (Nash’s Existence Theorem). [1] If we allow mixed strategies (where a pure strategy is
chosen at random, subject to some fixed probability), then every game with a finite number of players
in which each player can choose from finitely many pure strategies has at least one Nash equilibrium.
In our problem setting, the number of players is finite, each player has two pure strategies: win
or lose. Hence, we know that the Nash equilibrium exists in our problem setting. The next proposi-
tion shows that the teams can have mixed strategies if and only if all partial derivatives of winning
probabilities equals to zero.
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Proposition 3.3. For all m, W , and possible V , pi = (pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4) is the Nash equilibrium if and
only if 
∂E1
∂pi1
= 0,
∂E2
∂pi2
= 0,
∂E3
∂pi3
= 0,
∂E4
∂pi4
= 0,
(20)
Recall that we have mentioned that at this moment, we do not know the value of pi = (pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4),
hence we solve the equation system in proposition 3.3 without expanding A12 and A34, we can get
A34 =
4T1A−2T1B−2T1C
5T1A−T1B−4T1C ,
A34 =
4T2A−2T2B−2T2C
5T2A−T2B−4T2C ,
A12 =
4T3A−2T3C−2T3B
5T3A−T3B−4T3C ,
A12 =
4T4A−2T4C−2T4B
5T4A−T4B−4T4C ,
(21)
From equation system 21, we know that the Nash equilibrium follows
A34 =
4T1A − 2T1B − 2T1C
5T1A − T1B − 4T1C =
4T2A − 2T2B − 2T2C
5T2A − T2B − 4T2C (22)
A12 =
4T3A − 2T3C − 2T3B
5T3A − T3B − 4T3C =
4T4A − 2T4C − 2T4B
5T4A − T4B − 4T4C (23)
We have to solve these two equations. We know that the strategy is related to all team weights.
Next, we claim the following theorem:
Theorem 3.4. The only solution of 22, 23 is that v1 = v2 = 1, v3 = v4 ≤ 1.
By theorem 3.4, we know that the only situation where all teams have mixed strategies is when a2
is as strong as a1, a3 is as strong as a4. Next, we will give a proof of theorem 3.4.
Proof. Equation 22 implies that
T1BT2C − T1BT2A + T1CT2A + T1AT2B − T1AT2C − T1CT2B = 0 (24)
We can write 24 as
T1A(T2B − T2C) + T1B(T2C − T2A) + T1C(T2A − T2B) = 0 (25)
To solve 25, we have to introduce the Chebyshev’s sum inequality [2]
Lemma 3.2 (Chebyshev’s sum inequality). If a1 ≥ a2 ≥ ... ≥ an, b1 ≥ b2 ≥ ... ≥ bn, then
1
n
n∑
k=1
akbk ≥ ( 1
n
n∑
k=1
ak)(
1
n
n∑
k=1
bk) (26)
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Recall lemma 3.1, T1A ≥ T1B ≥ T1C ,T2B ≥ T2A ≥ T2C , if (T2C − T2A) ≥ (T2A − T2B), then by
Chebyshev’s sum inequality,
T1B(T2C−T2A)+T1C(T2A−T2B) ≥ 1
2
(T1B+T1C)(T2C−T2A+T2A−T2B) = 1
2
(T1B+T1C)(T2C−T2B) (27)
Applying 27 to 25, we get
0 ≥ T1A(T2B − T2C) + 1
2
(T1B + T1C)(T2C − T2B) = (T1A − T1B + T1C
2
)(T2B − T2C) (28)
This only happens when T1A = T1B = T1C . Otherwise,
T2C − T2A ≤ T2A − T2B (29)
We can also write equation 24 as T2B(T1A − T1C) + T2A(T1C − T1B) + T2C(T1B − T1A) = 0. By
applying Chebyshev’s sum inequality, we know that if T1C−T1B ≥ T1B−T1A, the only possible solution
is that T2A = T2B = T2C . Otherwise,
T1C − T1B ≤ T1B − T1A (30)
Similarly, we apply the same method to equation 23. We get
T4A − T4B ≤ T4B − T4C (31)
T3B − T3A ≤ T3A − T3C (32)
By solving 29, 30, 31, 32, we get that the only solution is that v1 = v2 = 1, v3 = v4 ≤ 1.
Now, we know that if v1 = v2 = 1, v3 = v4 ≤ 1, every team has mixed strategy. Next, we want to
find what the mixed strategy is. In this situation,
T1A = T1B = T2A = T2B ≥ T1C = T2C (33)
T3C = T4C = 1− T1C (34)
T3A = T3B = T4A = T4B = 1− T1A (35)
We re-calculate A12 and A34 by plugging 33, 34, 35 to equation 22, 23, we can get
A34 =
4T1A − 2T1B − 2T1C
5T1A − T1B − 4T1C =
2T1A − 2T1C
4T1A − 4T1C =
1
2
(36)
Similarly, A12 =
1
2 .
Corollary 3.5. Under the situation where v1 = v2 = 1, v3 = v4 ≤ 1, the mixed strategy (pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4)
satisfies pi1 = pi2, pi3 = pi4
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Proof. By expanding A34,
A34 = v34pi3pi4 + pi3(1− pi4) + 1
2
(1− pi3)(1− pi4) = pi3pi4 + 2pi3 − 2pi3pi4 + 1
2
− pi3 − pi4 + pi3pi4 = 1
2
(37)
We can get pi3 = pi4, similarly, by expanding A12, we can also get pi1 = pi2.
Next, we re-calculate the probability for each team to win the champion, Ei, i = {1, 2, 3, 4}, under
pi1 = pi2, pi3 = pi4.
Corollary 3.6. Under pi1 = pi2, pi3 = pi4, the probability for each team to win the champion, Ei, does
not depend on pi = (pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4).
Proof.
E1 = pi1pi2Q1a + (1− pi1)pi2Q1b + pi1(1− pi2)Q1c + (1− pi1)(1− pi2)Q1d
= pi21(Q1a −Q1b −Q1c +Q1d) + pi1(Q1b +Q1c − 2Q1d) +Q1d
Due to T1A = T1B, also by equation 36 we know A12 = A34 =
1
2 , we can get
Q1a −Q1b −Q1c +Q1d = 0 (38)
Q1b +Q1c − 2Q1d = 0 (39)
Thus, E1 = Q1d. Similarly, we can get E2 = Q2d,E3 = Q3d,E4 = Q4d. This proves that Ei is
independent with the strategy variable pi.
Hence, we can draw the following conclusion:
Theorem 3.7. Conclusion
If v1 = v2 = 1, v3 = v4 ≤ 1, then all pi1 = pi2, pi3 = pi4 are Nash equilibriums. Otherwise, all teams
should use pure strategy.
Now, we want to raise a question: How to compute the Nash equilibrium if pi1 6= pi2 or pi3 6= pi4?
From theorem 3.7, we know that all teams have pure strategy if pi1 6= pi2 or pi3 6= pi4, i.e. pi ∈ {0, 1}4.
Since card({0, 1}4) = 24 = 16, we can plug all these 16 possible pi to the verification process: given a
vector pi, we can calculate all Qij and draw the game theory table. Then, we can check whether the
game theory problem has dominant strategy or not. By theorem 3.2, we know that there exists some
solutions among the 16 possible pi.
If we are the coach of a sport team, to determine whether to try to win the next game or to lose
intentionally, we can use our algorithm to get the answer. We first approximate the team weights v1,
v2, v3, v4 by previous data. If the win vector before the next game is W , by applying our algorithm,
we can get the strategy pi = (pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4) and the probability of winning the champion of each team
E1, E2, E3, E4.
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4 Future Works
One important question is that whether theorem 3.7 holds when there are eight teams. A big
difference between the four-team model and eight-team model is that under the four-team model, lemma
3.1 holds for any v1 ≥ v2 ≥ v3 ≥ v4. However, under the eight-team model, according to the model
created by J. Schwenk [3], he showed that under some specific situations, the second seed has larger
probability than the first seed to win the tournament, which implies that we cannot generalize lemma
3.1 for the eight-team model. Hence, one of the future work is to find the Nash equilibrium under the
eight-team model. One possible method is following the definition of Nash equilibrium, proposition 3.3,
to solve the equation system. However, without lemma 3.1, we may not draw the conclusion that all
teams should use pure strategy for most cases.
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Appendices
A Proofs for FRNS Model
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2.1
Proof.
TA =
v1
v1 + v4
(
v1
v1 + v2
v2
v2 + v3
+
v1
v1 + v3
v3
v2 + v3
)
=
v21[v2(v1 + v3) + v3(v1 + v2)]
(v1 + v4)(v1 + v2)(v1 + v3)(v2 + v3)
TB =
v1
v1 + v3
(
v1
v1 + v2
v2
v2 + v4
+
v1
v1 + v4
v4
v2 + v4
)
=
v21[v2(v1 + v4) + v3(v2 + v4)]
(v1 + v4)(v1 + v2)(v1 + v3)(v2 + v4)
TC =
v1
v1 + v2
(
v1
v1 + v3
v3
v3 + v4
+
v1
v1 + v4
v4
v3 + v4
)
=
v21[v3(v1 + v4) + v4(v1 + v3)]
(v1 + v4)(v1 + v2)(v1 + v3)(v3 + v4)
Compare PA and PB, we compute
TA − TB =
(
v21
(v1 + v4)(v1 + v2)(v1 + v3)
)(
v2(v1 + v3) + v3(v1 + v2)
v2 + v3
− v2(v1 + v4) + v3(v2 + v4)
v2 + v4
)
=
(
v21
(v1 + v4)(v1 + v2)(v1 + v3)
)
(v1v2 + 2v2v3 + v1v3)(v2 + v4)− (v1v2 + v2v3 + v2v4 + v3v4)(v2 + v3)
=
(
v21
(v1 + v4)(v1 + v2)(v1 + v3)
)
(2v2v
2
3 − 2v23v4) =
(
v21
(v1 + v4)(v1 + v2)(v1 + v3)
)
(2v23(v2 − v4))
∵ v1 ≥ v2 ≥ v3 ≥ v4, ∴ TA − TB ≥ 0
Then, compare TB and TC , we compute
TB − TC =
(
v21
(v1 + v4)(v1 + v2)(v1 + v3)
)(
v2(v1 + v4) + v3(v2 + v4)
v2 + v4
− v3(v1 + v4) + v4(v1 + v3)
v3 + v4
)
=
(
v21
(v1 + v4)(v1 + v2)(v1 + v3)
)
((v1v2 + v2v4 + v2v3 + v3v4)(v3 + v4)− (v1v3 + v1v4 + 2v3v4)(v2 + v4))
=
(
v21
(v1 + v4)(v1 + v2)(v1 + v3)
)(
(v23v4 − v3v24) + (v2v23 − v2v3v4) + (v1v2v4 − v1v3v4)
)
=
(
v21
(v1 + v4)(v1 + v2)(v1 + v3)
)
(v3v4(v3 − v4) + v2v3(v2 − v4) + v1v4(v2 − v3))
∵ v1 ≥ v2 ≥ v3 ≥ v4, ∴ TB − TC ≥ 0
Thus, TA ≥ TB ≥ TC for any v1, v2, v3, v4, subject to v1 ≥ v2 ≥ v3 ≥ v4.
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A.2 Proof of Theorem 2.2
Proof.
P
(1)
pi=(1,1,1,1)(3,W, V )− P
(1)
pi=(0,1,1,1)(3,W, V ) = (p12p34TA + p12p43TB + p21p34TB + p21p43TA)
− (p34TA + p43TB)
= TAp12(2p34 − 1) + TBp12(1− 2p34)
= (TA − TB)p12(2p34 − 1)
∵ TA ≥ TB, p34 ≥ 12 , i.e. 2p34 − 1 ≥ 0, ∴ P
(1)
pi=(1,1,1,1)(3,W, V ) ≥ P
(1)
pi=(0,1,1,1)(3,W, V ) for all V =
[v1, v2, v3, v4].
This implies that it is always sensible for a1 to try to win if the performance vector W of first two
week is [2, 2, 0, 0].
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2.3
Proof. Under W = [1, 2, 0, 1] or [0, 1, 1, 2], we have
P
(1)
pi=(1,1,1,1)(3,W, V )− P
(1)
pi=(0,1,1,1)(3,W, V ) = (p21 − 1)p34TA + (p21 − 1)p43
1
3
(TA + TB + TC)
+ p12p43
1
3
(TA + TB + TC) + p21p43
1
2
(TA + TB)
= p12
(
−2
3
TA +
1
3
TB +
1
3
TC + p34(
5
6
TA − 1
6
TB − 2
3
TC)
)
Since we want to find V = (v1, v2, v3, v4) such that P
(1)
pi=(1,1,1,1)(3,W, V ) − P
(1)
pi=(0,1,1,1)(3,W, V ) ≥ 0,
which is equal to solve for p34 ≥ 4TA−2TB−2TC5TA−TB−4TC . Hence, we want to solve the following inequality:
v3
v3 + v4
≥ 4TA − 2TB − 2TC
5TA − TB − 4TC (40)
By expanding the right side of the inequality, we can get
3v2v3v
2
4 + 2v2v
3
4 + 6v
2
2v
2
3v4 + v2v
2
3v4 + v
3
3v4 + 2v3v
3
4 + 10v
2
3v
2
4 − 3v22v33
− v22v3v24 − 2v22v34 − v2v43 − 3v2v33v4 − 2v2v23v24 − v43v4 − 6v33v24 − 6v23v34 ≤ 0
which leads to theorem 2.3.
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A.4 Proof of Theorem 2.4
Proof. Under W = [1, 2, 1, 0], we have
P
(1)
pi=(1,1,1,1)(3,W, V )− P
(1)
pi=(0,1,1,1)(3,W, V ) = (p21 − 1)p34TB + (p21 − 1)p43
1
3
(TA + TB + TC)
+ p12p34
1
2
(TA + TB) + p12p43
1
3
(TA + TB + TC)
= p12
(
1
6
TA +
1
6
TB − 1
3
TC + p34(
1
6
TA − 5
6
TB +
2
3
TC)
)
Since we want to find V = (v1, v2, v3, v4) such that P
(1)
pi=(1,1,1,1)(3,W, V ) − P
(1)
pi=(0,1,1,1)(3,W, V ) ≥ 0,
which is equal to solve for p34 ≥ TA+TB−2TC−TA+5TB−4TC . Hence, we want to solve the following inequality:
v3
v3 + v4
≥ TA + TB − 2TC−TA + 5TB − 4TC (41)
By expanding the right side of the inequality, we can get
3v22v
2
3v4 + v2v
4
3 + v2v
3
3v4 + v
3
3v
2
4 + 4v
3
3v4 + 4v
2
3v
2
4 + 5v2v3v4
− 4v22v3v24 − 5v22v34 − 4v43v4 − 2v2v3v24 − v23v4 − v3v24 ≤ 0
which leads to theorem 2.4.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 3.1
Proof. By theorem 2.1, we know that if v1 ≥ v2 ≥ v3 ≥ v4, then
T1A ≥ T1B ≥ T1C (42)
Similar to theorem 2.1, we calculate T2A, T2B, T2C ,
T2A =
v2
v2 + v3
(
v2
v1 + v2
v1
v1 + v4
+
v2
v2 + v4
v4
v1 + v4
)
=
v22[v1(v2 + v4) + v4(v1 + v2)]
(v1 + v2)(v1 + v4)(v2 + v3)(v2 + v4)
T2B =
v2
v2 + v4
(
v2
v1 + v2
v1
v1 + v3
+
v2
v2 + v3
v3
v1 + v3
)
=
v22[v1(v2 + v3) + v3(v1 + v2)]
(v1 + v2)(v1 + v3)(v2 + v3)(v2 + v4)
T2C =
v2
v1 + v2
(
v2
v2 + v3
v3
v3 + v4
+
v2
v2 + v4
v4
v3 + v4
)
=
v22[v3(v2 + v4) + v4(v2 + v3)]
(v1 + v2)(v3 + v4)(v2 + v3)(v2 + v4)
23
Compare T2B and T2A, we compute
T2B − T2A =
(
v22
(v1 + v2)(v2 + v3)(v2 + v4)
)(
v1(v2 + v3) + v3(v1 + v2)
v1 + v3
− v1(v2 + v4) + v4(v1 + v2)
v1 + v4
)
=
(
v22
(v1 + v2)(v2 + v3)(v2 + v4)
)
(v1v2 + 2v1v3 + v2v3)(v1 + v4)− (v1v2 + 2v1v4 + v2v4)(v1 + v3)
=
(
v21
(v1 + v4)(v1 + v2)(v1 + v3)
)
(2v21v3 − 2v21v4) =
(
v21
(v1 + v4)(v1 + v2)(v1 + v3)
)
(2v21(v3 − v4))
∵ v1 ≥ v2 ≥ v3 ≥ v4, ∴ T2B − T2A ≥ 0
Then, compute T2A − T2C , we can get
T2A − T2C =
(
v22
(v1 + v2)(v2 + v3)(v2 + v4)
)(
v1(v2 + v4) + v4(v1 + v2)
v1 + v4
− v3(v2 + v4) + v4(v2 + v3)
v3 + v4
)
=
(
v22
(v1 + v2)(v2 + v3)(v2 + v4)
)
(v1v2 + 2v1v4 + v2v4)(v3 + v4)− (v2v3 + v2v4 + 2v3v4)(v1 + v4)
=
(
v21
(v1 + v4)(v1 + v2)(v1 + v3)
)
(2v1v
2
4 − 2v3v24) =
(
v21
(v1 + v4)(v1 + v2)(v1 + v3)
)
(2v24(v1 − v3))
∵ v1 ≥ v2 ≥ v3 ≥ v4, ∴ T2A − T2C ≥ 0
Hence, we can draw the conclusion that
T2B ≥ T2A ≥ T2C (43)
Next, we calculate T3A, T3B, T3C ,
T3A =
v3
v2 + v3
(
v3
v1 + v3
v1
v1 + v4
+
v3
v3 + v4
v4
v1 + v4
)
=
v23[v1(v3 + v4) + v4(v1 + v3)]
(v1 + v3)(v1 + v4)(v2 + v3)(v3 + v4)
T3B =
v3
v1 + v3
(
v3
v2 + v3
v2
v2 + v4
+
v3
v3 + v4
v4
v2 + v4
)
=
v23[v2(v3 + v4) + v4(v2 + v3)]
(v1 + v3)(v2 + v3)(v2 + v4)(v3 + v4)
T3C =
v3
v3 + v4
(
v3
v1 + v3
v1
v1 + v2
+
v3
v2 + v3
v2
v1 + v2
)
=
v23[v1(v2 + v3) + v2(v1 + v3)]
(v1 + v2)(v1 + v3)(v2 + v3)(v3 + v4)
Compare T3C and T3A, we compute
T3C − T3A =
(
v23
(v1 + v3)(v2 + v3)(v3 + v4)
)(
v1(v2 + v3) + v2(v1 + v3)
v1 + v2
− v1(v3 + v4) + v4(v1 + v3)
v1 + v4
)
=
(
v23
(v1 + v3)(v2 + v3)(v3 + v4)
)
(2v1v2 + v1v3 + v2v3)(v1 + v4)− (v1v3 + 2v1v4 + v3v4)(v1 + v2)
=
(
v21
(v1 + v4)(v1 + v2)(v1 + v3)
)
(2v21v2 − 2v21v4) =
(
v23
(v1 + v3)(v2 + v3)(v3 + v4)
)
(2v21(v2 − v4))
24
∵ v1 ≥ v2 ≥ v3 ≥ v4, ∴ T3C − T3A ≥ 0
Then, we compare T3A and T3B,
T3A − T3B =
(
v23
(v1 + v3)(v2 + v3)(v3 + v4)
)(
v1(v3 + v4) + v4(v1 + v3)
v1 + v4
− v2(v3 + v4) + v4(v2 + v3)
v2 + v4
)
=
(
v23
(v1 + v3)(v2 + v3)(v3 + v4)
)
((v1v3 + 2v1v4 + v3v4)(v2 + v4)− (v2v3 + 2v2v4 + v3v4)(v1 + v4)
=
(
v21
(v1 + v4)(v1 + v2)(v1 + v3)
)
(2v1v
2
4 − 2v2v24) =
(
v23
(v1 + v3)(v2 + v3)(v3 + v4)
)
(2v24(v1 − v2))
∵ v1 ≥ v2 ≥ v3 ≥ v4, ∴ T3A − T3B ≥ 0
Hence, we can draw the conclusion that
T3C ≥ T3A ≥ T3B (44)
Finally, we calculate T4A, T4B, T4C ,
T4A =
v4
v1 + v4
(
v4
v2 + v4
v2
v2 + v3
+
v4
v3 + v4
v3
v2 + v3
)
=
v24[v2(v3 + v4) + v3(v2 + v4)]
(v1 + v4)(v2 + v4)(v2 + v3)(v3 + v4)
T4B =
v4
v2 + v4
(
v4
v1 + v4
v1
v1 + v3
+
v4
v3 + v4
v3
v1 + v3
)
=
v24[v1(v3 + v4) + v3(v1 + v4)]
(v1 + v4)(v1 + v3)(v2 + v4)(v3 + v4)
T4C =
v4
v3 + v4
(
v4
v1 + v4
v1
v1 + v2
+
v4
v2 + v4
v2
v1 + v2
)
=
v24[v1(v2 + v4) + v2(v1 + v4)]
(v1 + v2)(v1 + v4)(v2 + v4)(v3 + v4)
Compare T4C and T4B, we compute
T4C − T4B =
(
v24
(v1 + v4)(v2 + v4)(v3 + v4)
)(
v1(v2 + v4) + v2(v1 + v4)
v1 + v2
− v1(v3 + v4) + v3(v1 + v4)
v1 + v3
)
=
(
v24
(v1 + v4)(v2 + v4)(v3 + v4)
)
(2v1v2 + v1v4 + v2v4)(v1 + v3)− (2v1v3 + v1v4 + v3v4)(v1 + v2)
=
(
v24
(v1 + v4)(v2 + v4)(v3 + v4)
)
(2v21v2 − 2v21v3) =
(
v24
(v1 + v4)(v2 + v4)(v3 + v4)
)
(2v21(v2 − v3))
∵ v1 ≥ v2 ≥ v3 ≥ v4, ∴ T4C − T4B ≥ 0
Then, we compare T4B and T4A,
T4B − T4A =
(
v24
(v1 + v4)(v2 + v4)(v3 + v4)
)(
v1(v3 + v4) + v3(v1 + v4)
v1 + v3
− v2(v3 + v4) + v3(v2 + v4)
v2 + v3
)
=
(
v24
(v1 + v4)(v2 + v4)(v3 + v4)
)
(2v1v3 + v1v4 + v3v4)(v2 + v3)− (2v2v3 + v2v4 + v3v4)(v1 + v3)
=
(
v24
(v1 + v4)(v2 + v4)(v3 + v4)
)
(2v1v
2
3 − 2v2v23) =
(
v24
(v1 + v4)(v2 + v4)(v3 + v4)
)
(2v23(v1 − v2))
25
∵ v1 ≥ v2 ≥ v3 ≥ v4, ∴ T4B − T4A ≥ 0
Hence, we can draw the conclusion that
T4C ≥ T4B ≥ T4A (45)
26
